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In Sections 4-6 we introduce three alternative assumptions of non-malleability of capital. In Section 4 we deal with the case of perfectly non-malleable capital in which the depreciation rate is equal to zero and in which the capital has a negligible scrap value. In Section 5 we continue to assume that the scrap value is zero, but allow for a positive depreciation rate. In this case we say that capital is "quasi-malleable." In Section 6 we allow for a positive unit scrap value, which is significantly below the replacement price.
The material presented in Sections 4-6 is of a descriptive nature. A rigorous analytic proof of all our results appears in Section 7. Our proof is based upon a method due to Caratheodory [4] , which does not seem to have been employed previously in economic analysis. Inasmuch as our model involves two stock variables (resource stock, capital stock) and two control variables (harvest rate, investment rate), it is structurally similar to a number of two-sector models of economic growth that have appeared in the literature [12, 14] . Such models are known to give rise to relatively complex optimal trajectories, frequently involving multiple switches of the control variables. Our model is no exception to this rule. On the other hand, our model is much less abstract than these growth models. It is an eight-parameter model, each parameter representing a measurable biological or economic variable. Because of the concrete nature of the model, the bio-economic reasons underlying the form of optimal exploitation policies become quite transparent, particularly since we are able to express the solution explicitly in synthesized (feedback) form: see Figures 1-3.
THE GENERAL MODEL
For the sake of explicitness we shall henceforth restrict our attention to a bio-economic model of the commercial fishery under sole ownership. The biological basis of the model is the general production model developed by Schaefer [17] and Pella and Tomlinson [15] ; the economic basis stems from the work of Gordon [11] , Crutchfield and Zellner [10] , and others (see Clark and Munro [8] ).
The population dynamics of the fishery resource is modeled by the equation
dix (2.1) -= F(x)-qEx, x (O) = x, dt where x (t) is population biomass at time t, F(x) is the natural growth function, q is the catchability coefficient (constant), and E(t) is fishing effort at time t. Regarding the natural, or biological, growth function F(x), we shall assume that (2.2) F(O)=F(x-)=O, F(x)>O, F"(x)<O for O<x?i.

In equation (2.1) the rate of harvest h(t) is of the form (2.3) h (t) = qE(t)x (t);
this particular form of the Cobb-Douglas production function is the traditional harvest production function employed in fishery rnodels.
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The variables x(t) and E(t) of equation (2.1) are subject to the constraints (2.4) x(t) >O and (2.5) ? -< E (t) -< Emax = K(t)
where Emax is maximum effort capacity and K (t) is the amount of capital invested in the fishery at time t. We shall think of K(t) as representing the number of "standardized" fishing vessels available to the fishery. Equation (2.5) then asserts that the maximum effort capacity equals the number of vessels available, and that the actual level of effort employed at any time cannot exceed Emax. The case I (t) = +oo allows for instantaneous jump increases in the level of capital. Admitting this possibility simplifies the analysis and lets us concentrate on the phenomenon of non-malleability of capital. As our objective function we employ the discounted net cash flow: 00 (2.9) J = } e8t{ph(t)-cE(t)-rI (t)} dt where 8 is the instantaneous rate of discount (constant), p is price of landed fish (constant), c is operating cost per unit effort (constant), and 7r is price (purchase or replacement) of capital (constant). All the parameters of our model, viz q, -y, 8, p, c, and ir, are taken as given constants, and all are assumed to be positive, except for the depreciation rate y, which we merely assume to be >'0. We shall refer to y = 0 as the case of perfect non-malleability, and to y >0 as the case of quasimalleability of capital. The problem we face is that of determining the optimal effort and investment policies E(t), I(t), leading to the maximization of the objective (2.9). In the next three sections we describe the solution to this problem, and discuss a variety of policy implications of the model. The rigorous justification of this solution is provided in Section 7. 
The corresponding control problem is as before.
PERFECTLY MALLEABLE CAPITAL
To set the stage for the more difficult problems generated by non-malleability of capital we review briefly the case in which capital is perfectly malleable, in the sense that 3) subject to the biomass equation (2.1) and to constraints (2.4) and (2.5) on x (t) and E(t). But in fact this is precisely the problem of the received dynamic model of the commercial fishery [8, 10] . We see therefore that the received theory assumes, whether explicitly or implicitly, that capital is perfectly malleable. The consequences of relaxing this assumption will become clear in the sequel.
The maximization problem for equation (3.3) subject to (2.1) has a particularly simple solution [6, 8] . Namely, there exists an optimal biomass level x=x determined by the "modified golden rule": The optimal approach to x* from a non-optimal initial biomass level x0 x* is the "most rapid" [18] or "bang-bang" [8] The role of the two biomass levels x and x* will become clear in the following discussions.
NON-MALLEABLE CAPITAL
We turn now to the main problem, that of delineating the optimal harvest and investment policies under the assumption that capital is non-malleable; see equation (2.8). As will become apparent, the form of the solution is complicated significantly by this assumption. In this and the next two sections we present a description of the optimal solution and a discussion of some of its implications, without attempting to give a proof of optimality. The proof is discussed in detail, however, in Section 7.
We commence with the easiest of the non-malleable capital cases, that in which capital is perfectly non-malleable. In this section, therefore, we shall assume that The initial point (4.2) lies in region R3. Consequently the optimal policy requires a once-and-for-all jump increase in the level of capital, up to the level K specified by the "switching curve" o-2. By assumption, this investment is completed instantaneously at time t = 0. Note that K > K*, so that the optimal level of capital exceeds the long-run optimum level that would prevail under conditions of perfect malleability (but not necessarily the short-run optimum).
Once the investment occurs at t = 0, capital costs cease to be relevant. The optimal biomass level thus becomes the "free capital" level, x-. If the optimal capital stock is K > K, we set E(t) = K. reducing the biomass stock, x(t), as rapidly as possible, until reaching the optimal stock level i. Upon reaching x, we then set E = K and henceforth harvest h = F(x) on a sustained-yield basis. In a sense the fishery is then "overcapitalized," in that the excess capital K -K is redundant.
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The overcapitalization, however, is only ex post and not ex ante, since the initial level of capital K is assumed to have been optimally determined.
Whether in fact K > K, given that x?0 =x, depends on the parameters of the model. If K < K, then the optimal biomass level i is not attainable at the effort rate E = K. The optimal policy calls for setting E = K for all t >0, and an equilibrium level lying between i and x* (see Figure 1) will thus be approached. In a sense we are "trapped" in that it neither pays to expand the capital stock sufficiently to make i a feasible equilibrium biomass level, nor does it pay to build up the biomass level to x*.
How is the switching curve OC2, which determines the optimal level of capitalization (given that x0 > x*), determined? Consider a point (x, K) in the state space, with K >K* and such that (x, K) lies to the right of the line BCD. Let S(x, K) denote the "return function," starting at time t = 0 at the point (x, K), and using the policy just described, i.e., I=0 for all t-0, and E=K as long as x>x, otherwise E = K. Thus S(x, K) is simply the present-value integral S(x, K) e|j eat{pqx -c}E(t) dt, 0 where E(t) is as above, and x(t) is the corresponding biomass, given by equation (2.1). The switching curve O_2 is then determined by the equation Let it be supposed first that K?> K. The cost of initial investment is a bygone and is thus irrelevant to future decisions. Moreover, the capital stock K? is abundant in the sense that there is more than sufficient capital to permit us to harvest F(x) on a sustained basis. Hence the optimal harvest policy is to set E = 0 until the biomass has grown to i and then to set E = K, i.e., to harvest F(i) on a sustained basis. From our discussion in Section 3 we recognize that at x = i the demand price of the biomass is equal to its supply price, given that the only relevant effort costs are operating costs.
Next let it be supposed that K* < K0 < K. (To consider a practical example, the fishery may hitherto have been subject to uncontrolled international exploitation, but is now encompassed by a coastal state's exclusive economic zone. Internal RENEWABLE RESOURCE STOCKS 33 political pressures compel the coastal state to exclude all foreign vessels. The remaining domestic fleet constitutes K0.) The initial stock of capital is no longer abundant, because it is insufficient to harvest F(x) on a sustained basis. The capital stock can be built up to K, but only at a cost of IT per unit. Yet, as will be proven in Section 7, at every point to the left of x* the demand price of capital, which we have characterized as aS(x, K)/aK, will be less than the supply price. Hence investment is non-optimal, so that we will be prevented from harvesting on a sustained basis at i. We will thus be confronted with an enforced "conservationist" policy in which the biomass will necessarily rise above i to an equilibrium level lying in the "trap" between x and x*. Moreover, as a consequence of the coming enforced conservation policy, it will no longer be optimal to refrain from harvesting until the biomass has grown to the level i. Rather, the optimal policy calls for switching from zero harvesting to maximum harvesting as x(t) crosses the switching curve o-1 (see Figure 1 ). This premature switching phenomenon is a common occurrence in linear optimal control problems. Finally in the case that K0<K* we see that the biomass level eventually recovers to the level x = x*. At this moment it becomes optimal to (suddenly) increase capital to the level K*, thus establishing a long-run equilibrium at the point (x*, K*).
The It is instructive to compare the above rehabilitation policy with the corresponding policy in the case of perfect malleability of capital, in which it is optimal to shut the fishery down entirely until the biomass has grown to x*. If harvesting capital is perfectly non-malleable, the optimal policy is radically altered. It will then never pay to refrain from harvesting once the biomass reaches the lower level x. If K <K, it will be optimal to commence harvesting at the maximum rate even before x(t) reaches i. The ultimate optimal equilibrium biomass level depends upon the initial stock of capital K?.
If capital depreciates at a positive rate, these conclusions must be altered. Let us now turn to this more interesting case. contrast to the perfectly non-malleable case, the system now tends to a uniquely determined long-run equilibrium, at (x*, K*). For this reason, it is appropriate to refer to x* as the long-run optimum biomass level, and to x as a (possible) short-run optimum biomass level. The description and interpretation of the optimal harvest and investment policies from any initial position is now straightforward. Two aspects of the optimal policy bear emphasizing, however. First note that the switching curve o1 now meets the line x = x at the point Q above K = K. The implication of this is as follows. Consider the system in short-run equilibrium with x = x and (x, K) lying above Q. Although the existing stock of capital is abundant, the abundance is RENEWABLE RESOURCE STOCKS 35 strictly temporary, because of depreciation. Anticipation of the coming "shortage" of capital-in the sense that the singular solution x(t)=x will eventually become non-feasible-leads to a switch in the harvesting policy at the point Q.
The switch is to a policy of harvesting at maximum rate (E = K), even though this switch will cause x(t) to fall temporarily below the short-run optimum i. The second and more important aspect concerns the general problem of restoration of an overexploited fishery. Although the optimal restoration policy ultimately leads to a long-run equilibrium at x = x* and K = K*, and although this equilibrium is the same as for the case of perfectly malleable capital, the restoration policies in the two cases are notably different. In the malleable case, the optimal restoration policy requires a complete moratorium. In the case that capital is quasi-malleable, however, the optimal approach to x* is far more gradual. Indeed, after a certain point it will be optimal to harvest at the maximum rate with the existing stock of capital. In other words, the disruptive consequences of a fishing moratorium can only be considered optimal in the case that fishing vessels have viable alternative uses, except that a brief moratorium may be optimal if the fish stock is very severely depleted (i.e., to the left of o1). The switching curve _3 is determined from the equation aS/a K r, The rationale behind this solution is quite straightforward. At any given time, the decision must be taken whether to disinvest, to invest, or to do neither. just as investment is indicated when there are "too few" vessels and "too many" fish, so is disinvestment indicated only when these conditions are reversed. Like investment, disinvestment turns out to be a once-and-for-all decision (there is an exception regarding investment, when x(t) returns to x*). If the decision is taken not to disinvest, then the optimal policy goes ahead exactly as if the disinvestment opportunity did not exist. Disinvestment may occur later, namely if the trajectory later hits x = x, above Q,.
A MARKET FOR SCRAP
We turn next to the alternative model specified by equations (2.10)-(2.13). Whereas the original model was linear in both control variables E, I, this
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Let us also note that, because of the disinvestment opportunity, there is now no short-run optimal equilibrium biomass level. (In control-theoretic language, x, is not a singular solution for this model, although i is such for the previous model.) From an arbitrary initial position the system ultimately converges to the same long-run equilibrium solution (x*, K*) as in the case of quasi-malleable capital.
The proof of optimality for this model is outlined in the next section.
PROOF OF OPTIMALITY
In this section we shall prove that the policy described above is indeed optimal for the problem at hand. The method we shall employ is one of verification rather than deduction. The solution was arrived at by the study of necessary conditions, a knowledge of the solution when K is constant, and a certain amount of trial and error. However, we shall not give a detailed account of this procedure; instead we simply prove optimality. A word about the necessary conditions: it is not possible to apply the Pontryagin maximum principle to the problem, since this principle is not valid when the permissible values of the controls (E, I) depend on the current value of the state variables (x, K), as they do here (E -K). We used instead the more general formulation of "differential inclusions" and some recent results (see [9] for a complete discussion) to first observe the existence of the two distinguished ("singular") values i and x* (see Section 3 above).
We remark in passing that the methods developed here should prove useful in other control-theoretic problems for which the maximum principle may prove inappropriate. For example, an exhaustible resource optimization model similar to our model has been discussed by Puu [16] ; our method can be used to complete and correct the proposed solution for this model. A recent model of capital accumulation and durable goods production (Kamien and Schwartz [13] ) also has a similar structure-and similar properties of optimal policies-to our model; it seems likely that our approach could be applied to models of this kind.
The verification technique we shall employ would be recognized by the expert as an adaptation of a classical approach in the calculus of variations sometimes labeled "the royal road of Caratheodory" (see, for example, [4] ). It has the advantage of being simple-minded and elementary. Of course, it depends upon knowing the answer in the first place! The basic idea is the following: let a harvesting-investment policy be specified from any initial value (x, K), and let the resulting net discounted return (see (2.9)) be denoted S(x, K). Suppose that for all values of (x, K), for all E in [0, K] and I > 0, the following inequality holds: But this says that the return from any other policy does not exceed the return from our given policy (it suffices to know this for policies with finite investment rates to conclude optimality). In summary, one can verify the optimality of a policy by producing a function S with the properties mentioned above. We shall now do just this for the policy described in the preceding sections. There remains also the task of precisely defining the switching curves, and there will be an added complication due to the fact that S will sometimes fail to be differentiable along these curves, but the underlying idea remains unchanged.
We assume henceforth that 8, -y > 0 (the case -y = 0 is simpler and can be treated with minor modifications). The constraint I : 0 is assumed. We also set q = r = 1, which merely amounts to a scaling of the variables E and K, but simplifies the notation. We assume that F is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies 
39
Finally we note the interpretation of (2.9) when I = oo is allowed: set to = 0, and suppose jumps in the value of K occur at times to, t1, t2, ..
If we denote the values immediately before and after these jumps by K(ti-) and K(ti+), respectively, and if a finite investment rate I(t) is employed between the jumps, then (2.9) is given by Figure 4) . It follows that for any (x, K) such that 0 < x < x *, K > 0, or such that x 2 x * and (x, K) lies above C1, the policy E=K, I=0 will result after finite time in arriving at x(t)=x*, O<K(t) K* (a sample trajectory is indicated in Figure 4 ). Let this arrival time be denoted r(xo, KO), and let K be increased to K* at time r; for t 3 r we remain at (x*, K*) by setting E = E*, I = yK*. We denote the net discounted return from this policy S(x, K). When this is substituted into (7.2), along with E(t) = K(t), we obtain the stated expression (all the discrete summation terms cancel except e 8`K(to-) = K). It is a consequence of the implicit function theorem that i is a twice continuously differentiable function of (x, K), and it is also known that x(t) and K(t Q.E.D.
As noted above, we have shown:
COROLLARY: Any trajectory using E = K, I = 0 meets o2 at most once.
Let us observe in passing that Lemma 9 shows that an optimal policy always results in temporary "overcapacity" under the circumstances that xo> x.
There are now two cases that present themselves, depending on whether o-2 intersects C2 at a point P having x <.x, or whether o-2 lies below C2 in the region x*<x<?.
We shall discuss the latter case, where it suffices to discuss the definition of S below o2 and above C2. (In the former case the redefinition of S above C2 and the left of P necessitates a redefinition of the switching curve o-2 above C2.) Above C2, we redefine our policy, and hence S, as follows: employ E = K, I = 0 until x = i, then proceed from that point as previously defined (preceding Lemma 6). The resulting net discounted return is S(x, K) for that region. Below o-2, we immediately increase the number of boats to the value placing us on o-2, and then we proceed as per our previously adopted policy. Note that by the preceding Corollary, we do not encounter o2 again. W. CLARK, F. H. CLARKE, AND G. R. MUNRO However, the present function S(x, K) is identical to the previous function S(x, K) except for R4 and points influenced by R4. Hence it is only in these regions that further verifications are required. These additional verifications are sufficiently similar to those already discussed that we can safely leave them to the reader.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated the implications of restricted malleability of capital for the optimal exploitation of renewable resource stocks. While the study has been carried out on the basis of a specific model of the commercial fishing industry, we believe that the qualitative nature of our results will prove to be robust.
Under the non-malleability assumption the dynamics of the optimally controlled fishery can be described in terms of short-run versus long-run behavior. Over the long run (unless capital is perfectly non-malleable) the fishery reaches an equilibrium state corresponding to "optimum sustained yield," for which the relevant cost function incorporates the full cost of fishing, i.e., operating plus capital costs. Following the initial development of the fishery, however, there is a short-run phase during which capital is excessive (from the long-run viewpoint), and only operating costs are relevant to the management decision. The development of the fishery thus follows a complex pattern of expansion, "overcapacity," and gradual contraction via depreciation, leading ultimately to the OSY equilibrium. We emphasize again that this pattern is an optimal one under the assumptions of our model.
In deriving these results we have been forced to adopt several simplifying assumptions. Perhaps the most serious of these lies in the autonomous nature of our model. Practically speaking, variability of economic parameters over time is more the rule than the exception in renewable resource industries. We make no attempt to analyze the effects of such variations here (the malleable case has been discussed in [8] ). Some information can be gleaned from a comparative dynamics approach, i.e., by studying the sensitivity of the solution to the parameters of the model. For example, it is easy to verify that the purchase price of capital v has no effect on the short-run equilibrium x, but affects x* positively and also affects the switching curve O2 in a negative sense. Thus higher capital costs have no effect on "bygones," but decrease the optimal (ex ante) level of capitalization, and result in lower levels of exploitation over the long run. The effects of varying other parameters are also easily worked out.
Finally, the policy implications of our study are sufficiently clear from a qualitative viewpoint. On the one hand, the analysis supports the accepted belief that excessive capitalization is likely to occur during the initial development of a common-property resource, although a certain degree of overcapitalization is now shown to be generally acceptable. On the other hand, the analysis shows that extreme policies of stock rehabilitation (e.g., fishing moratoria), may be unwarranted unless the stock has become very severely depleted. The less transferable
